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Congress and the Court at Cross Purposes: Labor's
Antitrust Exemption
The application of antitrust laws to labor union activities requires
the accommodation of two conflicting national policies. The anti-
trust laws seek to preserve a "competitive economy;"' the national
labor policy aims to preserve the "rights of labor to organize to
better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining." 2
The courts have long struggled to determine "how far Congress
intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize the re-
sults envisioned by the other."I The interface of labor and antitrust
policies has been marked by scant congressional guidance,4 a hand-
ful of United States Supreme Court decisions, 5 and much com-
ment.'
As recently as ten years ago, it was thought that the "labor ex-
emption" from the antitrust laws protected virtually all union activ-
ity;7 only in a narrow and well-defined set of situations would a labor
union be subject to the treble damage and injunctive provisions of
the antitrust laws.' However, the United States Supreme Court has
1. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. The statutory sources of labor's antitrust exemption are sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 and 29 U.S.C. § 52, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104,
105 and 113.
5. The leading modern cases include: Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters,
Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., Inc., 381 U.S. 676 (1965): United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
6. A partial list of fairly recent commentary since the Supreme Court decisions in the
Pennington and Jewel Tea cases includes: Bredhoff, Labor Unions Under the Sherman Act:
The Supreme Court Will Take Another Look, N.Y.U. 17TH CONF. ON LaB. 255 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Bredhoffi; Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel
Tea, 46 B.U.L. REV. 317 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Pennington and Jewel Tea]; Di Cola,
Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. PT. L. REV. 705
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Di Cola]; Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the
Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 659 (1965); Siegel, The Antitrust Exemption for
Labor-Magna Carta or Carte Blanche?, 13 DUQUESNE L. REV. 411 (1975); Timbers, The
Problems of Union Power and Antitrust Legislation, 16 LAB. L. J. 545 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Timbers]; Willis, In Defense of the Court: Accommodation of Conflicting National
Policies, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 22 MERCER L. REV. 561 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Willis].
7. Timbers, supra note 6, at 546.
8. Id. at 550.
These situations included: a union combination with a nonlabor group to accomplish a
prohibited purpose; a union acting unilaterally to achieve a direct restraint on the product
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recently dealt that view a severe blow, and articulated its position
that more and more labor activities fall within the purview of the
antitrust laws. The vehicle for that position was Connell Constr. Co.
v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local No. 100.'
THE HISTORY OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION
The antitrust laws reflect a national policy favoring competition,
which is designed to promote economic efficiency, consumer welfare
and a system of diffused power. Its primary feature is the elimina-
tion of restraint.' On the other hand, national labor policy tolerates
large-scale labor organizations despite their capacity to interfere
with the objectives of the antitrust laws. The factor of restraint is
inherent in collective bargaining affecting both employer and union.
It is evident that labor and antitrust policies must conflict whenever
they meet, and such has been the case."
The Sherman Act," enacted to curb growing concentrations of
corporate power and resulting anticompetitive effects, was immedi-
ately applied by lower federal courts to union activity.'" In 1908, the
United States Supreme Court, in the Danbury Hatter's Case," read
the Sherman Act literally and held that it applied to combinations
by labor. Congress responded by seeking, in 1914, to exempt the
existence of labor unions and certain labor activities from antitrust
sanctions in the passage of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act.'"
However, the extent to which the scope of the antitrust laws was
limited by these provisions was not clear. The exemptions were
virtually destroyed when the Supreme Court declared in Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering"' that section 6 was a mere codification
of existing law-an intent to restrain trade was not a "legitimate"
object of a labor organization. Further, the Court stated that any
market; and union activities not within the scope of a labor dispute as defined in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Only in these unusual circumstances would a union forfeit its antitrust
immunity. Id. But see note 29 infra.
9. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
10. See generally Willis, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
13. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YAi.E L.J. 14 (1963).
14. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1970). Section 6 provides that labor organizations are not
illegal combinations in restraint of trade. Section 20 limits the courts' power to grant injunc-
tive relief in labor disputes generally, and specifically forbids court action to restrain lawful
union tactics in disputes concerning terms or conditions of employment.
16. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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exemption established by section 20 must be narrowly construed to
apply only where there is a dispute over "terms or conditions of
employment"' 7 between the employer and his immediate employ-
ees.
The broad reach of the Sherman Act was not reduced until the
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act"8 in 1932. Congress explic-
itly overturned the Court's narrow construction of section 20 of the
Clayton Act and prohibited the issuance of injunctions in all cases
involving a "labor dispute."' 9
A dramatic change in judicial attitude toward regulation under
the Sherman Act of coercive union activities was evident in the next
major decision in this area, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.' The Su-
preme Court held that the antitrust laws were directed only at re-
straints which had an intended effect upon price strictures and
competitive conditions in the product market. Apparently, the
Court articulated a vague exception for union activities which were
directed at the labor market, as opposed to the product market.2'
One year later, in United States v. Hutcheson," the Court specifi-
cally considered the question of a union's antitrust liability:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not
to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or un-
wisdom, the rightness or wrbngness, the selfishness or unselfish-
ness of the end of which the particular union activities are the
means.
.23
Following Hutcheson, courts primarily considered the existence of
an improper combination between labor and nonlabor groups in
determining the scope of labor's exemption.24 The Supreme Court
recognized an exception to labor's immunity arising from an impro-
per business combination in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3,
IBEW.25 The union had obtained an agreement whereby all electri-
cal contractors were to purchase electrical equipment exclusively
from local manufacturers employing union labor. The manufactur-
17. Id. at 472.
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1970).
20. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
21. Id. at 505-13.
22. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
23. Id. at 232.
24. See Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66
COi.uM. L. REv. 742, 745 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Labor's Antitrust Exemption].
25. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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ers, in turn, agreed to sell only to contractors who employed union
members. These agreements had led to an industry-wide under-
standing which proved highly successful in increasing both the price
of electrical equipment and the wages of union members. The Court
held that Congress never intended that unions should aid nonlabor
groups to create monopolies or control the marketing of goods and
services.2" The Court was careful to distinguish such aid from unilat-
eral union activity which might achieve an end similar to that which
results from labor and business acting in concert: unions that aid
and abet business combinations violate antitrust laws; unions that
unilaterally employ strikes, boycotts and other acts recognized by
section 20 of the Clayton Act do not.27 This decision clearly indi-
cated the limit of labor's exemption: although goals pursued by the
union had been legitimate, the combination with nonlabor caused
the activity to exceed the exemption.28
Construing the Apex and Allen Bradley decisions together, it ap-
pears that the Court attempted to reconcile the conflicting policies
of the Sherman Act and the labor statutes. The labor statutes pre-
dominated when conduct related to labor standards, irrespective of
any indirect effect on the pricing and marketing of goods. The Sher-
man Act governed when conduct directly regulated the pricing and
marketing of goods.29
For 20 years, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court acted upon
labor's antitrust exemption as set out in Apex, Hutcheson and Allen
Bradley.'" However, in 1965, the Supreme Court decided the com-
26. Id. at 808.
27. Id. at 809-10.
28. Id. It has been suggested that Allen Bradley's most serious flaw is that it makes union
antitrust liability turn on an issue irrelevant to antitrust policy. In Allen Bradley, and again
in Pennington, the Court admitted that the union, had it acted unilaterally, could have
escaped antitrust liability. This test, turning on the existence of a combination with non-
labor, fails to take into account the anticompetitive nature of the conduct. See Di Cola, supra
note 6, at 714-15. The Connell decision apparently cures this defect by holding, for the first
time, that a union acting alone is not necessarily antitrust exempt.
29. It has been suggested that Apex and Allen Bradley together provide the following
principles: (1) restraints relating to "labor standards" fall wholly outside the Sherman Act.
They are lawful whether accomplished by a union alone, by a combination of unions and
employers or by an association of employers alone; (2) restraints on the marketing and pricing
of goods accomplished by a "combination" of unions and employers fall within the Sherman
Act. They are unlawful, unless saved by the "rule of reason;" and (3) restraints on the
marketing and pricing of goods accomplished by a union "acting alone" fall within section 6
and are therefore lawful. Bredhoff, supra note 6, at 262-63. But see Cheit, Public Policy
Toward Trade Unions: Antimonopoly Laws, 9 LAB. L.J. 705 (1958), where the author suggests
that labor union activities are antitrust exempt only so long as they are confined to labor
groups, labor disputes and labor markets. Thus, in this view, acts that fall outside labor
market boundaries or that involve direct product market restraints will not be protected.
30. For an exhaustive review of lower court decisions during this period, see Labor's
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panion cases of United Mine Workers v. Pennington" and Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc.
:2
In Pennington, small coal producers alleged a Sherman Act viola-
tion because the union had agreed to a minimum wage scale with
large coal producers. The agreement would have effectively forced
small operators out of business. The Court held that unions forfeit
antitrust immunity when
. . . it is clearly shown that it [the union] has agreed with one
set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining
units. One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate com-
petitors from the industry and the union is liable with the employ-
ers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy. This is true even though
the union's part in the scheme is an undertaking to secure the same
wages, hours or other conditions of employment from the remain-
ing employers in the industry. 3
However, the majority explicitly recognized that a union could
properly enter into an agreement with a multi-employer bargaining
unit which provided for wages that other employers would very
likely be unable to meet, and that it could do so with the full inten-
tion of imposing similar terms on all such other employers. The
limits of the exemption would be exceeded only where .the union and
the multi-employer group agreed that such terms would be secured
from the other employers.
In the companion case, Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc. ,3 the employer challenged the valid-
ity of a clause in its collective bargaining contract which prevented
it from operating its meat counters after 6:00 p.m. Jewel had agreed
to sign the measure only under threat of strike. The trial court found
that Jewel could not extend the marketing hours without either
increasing the butchers' hours or using nonunion butchers. Further,
the court found that the union had formulated the restriction and
pursued its adoption unilaterally in order to serve its own interests.5
There was no evidence of a union-employer conspiracy, even though
some 9,000 other employers had agreed to the concession. On these
facts, the challenged activity was found protected by the labor ex-
emption to the Sherman Act.3"
Antitrust Exemption, supra note 24, at 746-49.
31. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
32. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
33. 381 U.S. at 665-66.
34. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
35. 215 F. Supp. 839 (N.D.IIl.), rev'd, 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1963).
36. Id. at 845.
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On review, the Supreme Court adopted the trial court's findings,
while reversing the Seventh Circuit. Justice White commented on
the scope of legitimate union interests:
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restric-
tion, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to
wages, hours and working conditions that the union's successful
attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arm's-length
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at
the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within
the protection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt
from the Sherman Act.
3 7
This analysis has been labeled the test of "legitimate union inter-
est." Subjecting the Jewel agreement to this test, the Court
weighed the agreement's impact on the product market against its
relevance to the interests of the union members and found the union
activity protected by the exemption. 9
In a single opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg, with whom Justices
Harlan and Stewart concurred, dissented from the Court's
Pennington judgment and concurred in the Jewel Tea opinion."' He
stated his position as follows:
Following the sound analysis of Hutcheson, the Court should hold
37. 381 U.S. at 689-90.
In a footnote immediately following this statement, Justice White declared that the "cru-
cial determinant" was not the subject matter of the agreement, but rather was its "relative
impact on the product market and the interests of union members." It has been suggested
that these formulations may give rise to several alternative constructions. In view of Justice
White's assumption that the questions of exemption and antitrust violation are separate, it
appears that the "intimately related" test is based solely upon consideration of the benefit
to labor. A finding of not "intimately related" would strip the union of its exemption, but
the question would remain whether a substantive antitrust violation had occurred. This
problem is discussed in Morse Bros. v. Local No. 701, International Union of Operating
Engineers, 87 L.R.R.M. 2833 (D. Or. 1974). On the other hand, if Justice White's balancing
test is applied to determine exemption, it seems likely that a competitive restraint deemed
sufficient to overrule labor's exemption would also be held an antitrust violation. See Labor's
Antitrust Exemption, supra note 24, at 757-59.
38. In Justice White's view, the agreement would not be antitrust immune if it produced
an anticompetitive effect and benefited union members only indirectly. By tying the labor
exemption to the "intimate relation" of the activities involved to mandatory subjects of
bargaining, the Court has substituted its view of proper, i.e., legitimate, union interest for
the "self-interest" concept of Hutcheson, 381 U.S. at 688-90.
39. 381 U.S. at 691. The Court stated:
[Allthough the effect on competition is apparent and real . . . the concern of
union members is immediate and direct. Weighing the respective interests in-
volved, we think the national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements
on when, as well as how long, employees must work.
40. 381 U.S. at 697.
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that, in order to effectuate congressional intent, collective bargain-
ing activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust laws. This rule flows
directly from the Hutcheson holding that a union acting as a
union, in the interests of its members, and not acting to fix prices
or allocate markets in aid of an employer conspiracy to accomplish
these objects, with only indirect union benefits, is not subject to
challenge under the antitrust laws."
Thus, it appears that the rule to be gleaned from the majority
opinions in Pennington and Jewel Tea is that a labor union is ex-
empt from the operation of the antitrust laws provided it acts uni-
laterally and in the pursuit of its own interests, rather than in com-
bination or conspiracy with nonlabor groups. Additionally, the ac-
tivities must be in furtherance of a subject matter of immediate and
legitimate union concern, such as wages, hours and working condi-
tions, and not in furtherance of matters which are of only indirect
concern to the union, such as prices and other marketing factors."
Subsequent to Pennington and Jewel Tea, the Court twice
avoided opportunities to state more clearly its approach to the labor
exemption question. No enlightenment was forthcoming.
In American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll," the union
sought to protect musicians' wages by imposing a detailed mini-
mum price list upon orchestra leaders, relative to "one-shot" en-
gagements. The orchestra leaders claimed that the list unnecessar-
ily stifled competition. The Court, however, held that the nature of
the industry was such that the musicians' product and labor were
the same item, so that an agreement as to the cost of labor necessar-
ily fixed prices. In so declaring, the Court obviated the necessity of
explicitly addressing the labor exemption question; however, the
Court found that the agreement was nevertheless in furtherance of
a legitimate union interest. The most significant aspect of the case,
as noted by Justice White in dissent, 4 is that the Court abandoned
its Jewel Tea "balancing approach" for the determination of legiti-
mate union interest.
Ramsey v. United Mine Workers 5 presented a fact situation al-
41. Id. at 710.
42. This statement of the Pennington-Jewel Tea holding was set forth by District Judge
Wilson in his opinion in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265 F. Supp. 338, 398 (E.D. Tenn.
1967).
43. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
44. Id. at 116-17. The majority had stated that the crucial determinant was the impact
of the price setting on the union membership. Justice White, in contrast; urged that the
benefit to union members should be weighed against the anticompetitive impact.
45. 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
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most identical to that of Pennington. Small coal miners, alleging an
antitrust violation, sought to prove the existence of an express or
implied agreement between the UMW, the sole defendant, and a
multi-employer group. The alleged agreement imposed a certain
wage scale on all coal mine operators, with the result that the
smaller operators would be driven out of the market.
The Supreme Court, clarifying its Pennington holding that a
union loses its exemption when "it is clearly shown that it has
agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units,"4 held that the usual preponderance of the
evidence standard applies in determining substantive antitrust vio-
lation.47 No clarification, however, was forthcoming on the Court's
view of the scope of the labor exemption.
Predictably, the lower federal courts have had considerable diffi-
culty in extracting much guidance from the fragmented Pennington
and Jewel Tea opinions, which do not appear to have substantially
altered lower courts' treatment of the labor-antitrust dilemma.
Hutcheson has been referred to as the "prevailing view" of the
labor exemption, with Jewel Tea being merely an application of the
Hutcheson doctrine.4" Several opinions have addressed the question
of the type of activity sufficient to bring a union into the "combina-
tion with nonlabor" situation. These opinions have universally
ignored the implications of Jewel Tea that not all unilateral union
activity is immune from antitrust prosecution.5 0 At least one court
stated absolutely that a union has no antitrust liability so long as
it acts alone;"1 only the Connell appeals court recognized that Jewel
Tea may have circumscribed the holdings of Allen Bradley and
Hutcheson."
46. 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
47. The clear proof standard, Justice White asserted, is limited to establishing the union's
participation in the antitrust violation. Only a preponderance of the evidence is required to
establish whether the substantive violation had in fact occurred. 401 U.S. at 311.
48. Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., 494 F.2d 541 (9th
Cir. 1974).
49. Id.; Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974);
Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1973).
50. The Court suggested in Jewel Tea that it might be limiting the Hutcheson-Allen
Bradley holdings that a union is antitrust exempt so long as it acts alone:
It might be argued that absent any union-employer conspiracy against Jewel and
absent any agreement between Jewel and any other employer, the union-Jewel
contract cannot be a violation of the Sherman Act. The fact that the parties to the
agreement are but a single employer and the unions representing its employees does
not compel immunity for the agreement. We must consider the subject matter of
the agreement in the light of the national labor policy.
381 U.S. at 689.
51. Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1973).
52. 483 F.2d 1154, 1166 (5th Cir. 1973).
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JEWEL TEA REFORMULATED
Connell: The Facts
Recently, the Court again undertook the task of attempting to
reconcile conflicting labor and antitrust policies. The Connell Con-
struction Company, a Texas general contractor, was contacted by
the Plumbers and Steamfitters Union, and was asked to sign a
contract whereby Connell agreed not to subcontract business to any
plumbing or mechanical firm which did not have a current collec-
tive bargaining agreement with that union. When Connell refused
to sign the contract within the union's ten-day deadline, the union
placed a single picket at one of the contractor's projects in Dallas.
Approximately 150 employees left the jobsite, effectively halting
construction. The subcontractor engaged at that project did, in fact,
have a current collective .bargaining agreement with the union.
None of Connell's employees were union members, and the union
specifically denied any interest in organizing them.
Connell brought suit in a Texas state court alleging a violation of
the Texas antitrust laws, and was granted a temporary injunction
against the picketing. 3 The union removed the case to federal court.
Connell signed the subcontracting agreement under protest and
amended its complaint, alleging that the agreement violated the
federal antitrust laws and was therefore invalid.
The Connell district court reached the merits of the antitrust
claim and found the union exempt. The district court thus adhered
to the Seventh Circuit decision of Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v.
Rockford Building and Constr. Trades Council.55 The district court
The Jewel Tea opinion contained dictum concerning the union's freedom of action, either
acting alone or in combination with employers, with respect to subjects outside the manda-
tory bargaining area. For example, the Court stated that if the union had insisted upon a
price schedule and the employer had acquiesced, the agreement would be subject to antitrust
challenge. 381 U.S. at 689. Professor Archibald Cox has suggested that this dictum either cuts
back on the Hutcheson view of the labor exemption, or
presages an interpretation of "labor dispute" in the Norris-LaGuardia Act that
would render that statute inapplicable to concerted activities dealing with access
to or competition in the product market which yield no direct benefits to the union
members but only such returns as come from increasing the gross income of the
employers.
Pennington and Jewel Tea, supra note 6, at 327. But such an interpretation of a labor dispute
was previously rejected by the Court in AUen.Bradley. See note 74 infra.
53. 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
54. Id.
55. 354 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966). On facts very similar to
those of Connell, the subcontractor-plaintiff brought an antitrust suit to challenge an agree-
ment between a contractors' association and a building trades council. The agreement con-
tained a provision precluding the signatory contractors from subcontracting to anyone who
[Vol. 7
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held that Congress had, in amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, expressly recognized the validity of contracts such as the
one challenged as a legitimate subcontracting agreement in the con-
struction industry. 56
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
result without reaching the issue of the validity of the challenged
contract under the National Labor Relations Act.57 Judge Morgan
analyzed the Connell situation in view of Justice White's two-fold
exemption test as expressed in Pennington and Jewel Tea. First, the
court found no agreement sufficient to destroy antitrust immunity
since the union had not conspired with a nonlabor group to injure
Connell's business."6 The only nonlabor party to the agreement was
the plaintiff; this, said the court, was "strong evidence" that the
union was acting in its own self-interest and that no monopoly was
being formed.5 '
The court proceeded to discuss Justice White's second test -
whether the agreement furthered a "legitimate union interest.""
The agreement was viewed as a means of eliminating competition
based on differences in labor standards and wages, and an attempt
by defendant Local No. 100 to unionize as many subcontractors as
possible. This, opined the court, was a legitimate union goal, anti-
trust exempt even though the conduct in question may have been
pursued by means tantamount to unfair labor practices:
[Flor antitrust purposes the term "legitimate union interest" is
not controlled by whether or not the goal sought or the methods
used in attempting to reach that goal violate the ground rules for
did not have a collective bargaining agreement with the council or its local affiliate union.
The plaintiff employed members of a union not affiliated with the council and was therefore
deprived of a construction job. The plaintiff alleged that economic coercion had been brought
against the general contractor to sign the agreement and therefore discharge the plaintiff.
The court held that the subcontracting agreement in question had been specifically author-
ized by the construction industry exception to the NLRA's section 8(e) ban against hot-cargo
clauses. If the conduct was specifically authorized in the NLRA, the Seventh Circuit rea-
soned, "it would be unreasonable to hold that success in securing such an agreement consti-
tues a violation of the antitrust laws." 354 F.2d at 3. As correctly pointed out by the Connell
company, Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters,
Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), the distinguishing feature between Suburban Tile and
Connell is the absence of a collective bargaining relationship in Connell.
56. See the construction industry proviso to 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
57. 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 1166.
59. Id. The Court recognized that lack of conspiracy was insufficient to merit exemption:
From the thicket of Jewel Tea, a lower court is left with a feeling that mere failure
to allege and prove conspiracy does not mean that labor's exemption from the
antitrust laws automatically applies.
60. Id. at 1166-67.
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labor relations set forth in the NLRA. If and when those ground
rules are violated, punishment must come through the procedures
and in the manner specified by Congress in the labor laws. Absent
a viable conspiracy allegation, a union retains its exemption from
antitrust attack so long as the terms of the agreement it seeks are
designed to benefit its members in the hours, conditions, and other
immediately relevant concerns of the working man."
Connell: The Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit, 2 holding that the agreement between the union and
the general contractor, which was outside the collective bargaining
relationship and not limited to a particular jobsite, and which obli-
gated Connell to subcontract only to union signatories, could form
the basis for a federal antitrust suit. The case was remanded for
consideration of whether the agreement did, in fact, constitute a
substantive antitrust violation.63
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, justified this conclusion
by stating that the agreement, signed under protest by Connell,
gave the union complete control over subcontracting work offered by
the general contractor. This agreement constituted a direct restraint
on the business market and indiscriminately excluded nonunion
subcontractors from a portion of that market, even if their competi-
tive advantages were derived not from substandard labor conditions
but resulted from more efficient operating methods. "
Despite the Court's finding that the union's sole goal - organiz-
ing as many subcontractors as possible - was "legitimate," the
Court held that "the methods the union chose are not immune from
antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal."" This type of
direct restraint on the business market, Justice Powell reasoned,
had substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential,
that would not "follow naturally from the elimination of competi-
tion over wages and working conditions." 6 The restraint, he added,
"contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congres-
sional labor policy."67
Setting aside the question of labor's antitrust exemption, the
61. Id. at 1170.
62. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
63. Id. at 637.
64. Id. at 623.
65. Id. at 625.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Court rejected the union's alternative contention that the agree-
ment was valid under the construction industry exception to the
general interdiction against agreements not to deal in the goods or
services of another expressed in section 8(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act." The Court, however, declared that the section 8(e)
proviso protects only those agreements which arise within the con-
text of a collective bargaining relationship and which limit their
coverage to a particular jobsite15
The Court dismissed the main argument of the dissenters with a
footnote. 0 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall, had found it unnecessary to decide whether the chal-
lenged agreement did in fact violate section 8(e). He cited exten-
sively from the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, the
1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, and subsequent legislative an-
titrust proposals7 to demonstrate that Congress had specifically
rejected efforts to extend antitrust liability to union secondary ac-
tivity. The Court further rejected the dissenters' contention that
Congress had provided an exclusive remedy for section 8(e) viola-
tions and other unfair labor practices through enactment of section
303 of the National Labor Relations Act, which authorized suits for
recovery of all compensatory damages by any injured employer.72
Justice Douglas contributed a brief separate dissent. Citing Allen
Bradley, he found the lack of a viable allegation of conspiracy deter-
minative; absent a conspiracy, antitrust laws are inapplicable, and
the general contractor's remedies, if any, were provided exclusively
by labor laws.73
The Connell decision is difficult to reconcile with previous Court
pronouncements in the labor-antitrust area. The majority carved
from the traditional statutory antitrust exemption allowed unilat-
eral union activity a limited nonstatutory exemption in some cases
involving union-employer agreements. The Connell Court denied
68. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). The excepting proviso states, in pertinent part:
[NIothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organiza-
tion and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction.
The Fifth Circuit had declined to decide this issue, holding that it was subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 483 F.2d at 1174.
69. 421 U.S. at 631. However, to suggest that such an agreement is to be negotiated site-
by-site is to ignore the realities of subcontracting in the construction industry. See Address
by Florian Bartosic, Secretary, ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, on Supreme Court
Decisions in October 1974 Term, in 157 B.N.A. Daily Lab. Rep. at D-12 (August 13, 1975).
70. Id. at 634-35n.16.
71. S.2573, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
73. 421 U.S. at 638.
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the union the benefit of either exemption.
Historically, a union may claim a statutory exemption from the
antitrust laws so long as it acts unilaterally in the furtherance of its
own legitimate objectives in the course of a bona fide labor dispute.
The Connell Court summarily dismissed the possibility of a statu-
tory exemption for the union. In so doing, the Court ignored the
possibility that the Plumbers and Steamfitters Local No. 100 acted
unilaterally in the course of a labor dispute.
The existence of a "labor dispute" has always been an important
initial criterion for determining the existence of labor's statutory
exemption.74 The most oft-quoted Court pronouncement on the
scope of a labor dispute is:
74. See Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 104-06 (1970).
"Labor dispute" has been legislatively defined at 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1970):
(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the
case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupa-
tion; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same
employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employ-
ers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or
associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees;
(2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more
employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or
associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees;
or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute"
(as defined in this section) of "persons participating or interested" therein (as
defined in this section).
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or inter-
ested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged
in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or
has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any
association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such
industry, trade, craft, or occupation.
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of per-
sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
Congress and the Court early conflicted on the proper reach of the term "labor dispute,"
when the Court, in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 472 (1921), held that
section 20 of the Clayton Act was to be construed narrowly to apply only to those parties to
a dispute "concerning terms or conditions of employment" who stood in a "proximate rela-
tion" to the controversy and who were "affected in a proximate and substantial, not merely
a sentimental, sense by the cause of the dispute." When Congress considered the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in 1932, it specifically sought to overturn this narrow definition. See Report
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 4, 1932, noted in KORETZ, STATUTORY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES LABOR ORGANIZATION 169 (1970). When the Court next undertook this
task, in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), Justice Frankfurter reasoned that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was a congressional interpretation of section 20 of the Clayton Act
which was inconsistent with Duplex. Thus, so long as activity was within the bounds of a
"labor dispute," as redefined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it was protected from Sher-
man Act liability.
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[T]here may be a "labor dispute" where the disputants do not
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. But the
statutory classification, however broad, of parties and circumstan-
ces to which a "labor dispute" may relate does not expand the
application of the Act to include controversies upon which the
employer-employee relationship has no bearing. 5
Reason dictates that the Connell situation should be encom-
passed within the bounds of the above statement, thereby qualify-
ing for the statutory exemption.76 Although Connell was not an em-
ployer of union members, the realities of collective bargaining rela-
tionships in the construction industry indicate that the general con-
tractor is intimately concerned with the labor affairs of its subcon-
tractors.77 To conclude that this dispute had no bearing on the
It was thought at the time of the Hutcheson decision that a union remained wholly antitrust
exempt so long as it acted alone. However, the Court recognized that a union's immunity
extends only to conduct undertaken in the course of a labor dispute. See Columbia River
Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942). Controversy remained as to the proper reach
of the term "labor dispute." It was suggested that a union's attempt to impose a direct
restraint on the product market did not constitute a labor dispute. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L
COMM. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS REPORT 296-300 (1955). The Allen Bradley Court
considered such a contention and rejected the argument that the union's attempt to provide
a sheltered market for union employers did not constitute a labor dispute. Although the union
lost its immunity because of its combination with nonlabor, the Court rejected the contention
that no labor dispute existed:
We do not have here, as we did in Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, a
dispute between groups of business men revolving solely around the price at which
one group would sell commodities to another group. On the contrary, Local No. 3
is a labor union and its spur to action related to wages and working conditions.
325 U.S. at 807n.12. Generally, the prevailing opinion is that the Hutcheson rule governs the
scope of a labor dispute, and any activity in the union's self-interest meets that criterion. See
Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 267-70
(1955) [hereinafter cited as A Preliminary Analysis].
75. Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1942) (emphasis
added).
76. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 807 (1945). The union had
waged an agressive campaign to obtain closed-shop agreements with all local electrical equip-
ment manufacturers and contractors. Using strikes and boycotts, it gradually obtained more
and more closed-shop agreements in the New York City area. Under these agreements, con-
tractors were obligated to purchase equipment from none but local manufacturers who also
had closed-shop agreements with Local No.3, and manufacturers obligated themselves to
confine their New York City sales to contractors employing the union's members. Since the
union's contribution to the joint union-employer plan was accomplished through threats to
withhold labor, the Allen Bradley Court stated that in the absence of the union-employer
conspiracy it would have been exempt. The means used fell squarely within the specified acts
declared by section 20 of the Clayton Act not to be violations of federal law. The means used
by the union in Connell to obtain its agreement were substantially similar.
77. This is the precise reason for the various common-situs picketing bills, the latest of
which is discussed at text accompanying notes 139 through 144 infra. The view is that because
of the close community of interests on a construction site, no employer can be truly neutral
in the disputes of another.
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employer-employee relationship would be tenuous-the general
contractor was not a disinterested party, and the methods used by
the union were a common approach to unionization in the construc-
tion industry."5
The Connell majority seems to admit that the statutory exemp-
tion should apply in this case,"9 but relies upon contorted applica-
tion of the Allen Bradley "combination with nonlabor" test to de-
feat the union's exemption claim. That the Court does not consider
the union's activity unilateral is demonstrated by statements in
response to the dissenters' contention that Congress had specifically
considered and rejected attempts to narrow the statutory exemp-
tion. While correctly pointing out that the rejected proposals were
broader than the Connell issue, the Court stated that the mere fact
that Congress had rejected those proposals "hardly furnishes proof
that it intended to extend labor's antitrust immunity to include
agreements with nonlabor parties, or that it thought antitrust liabil-
ity under the existing statutes would be inconsistent with the
NLRA." s Therefore, it seems that the Court recognizes that the
union's activity, if unilateral, should be immune. Concluding, how-
ever, that the union's activity was not unilateral, the Court found
that the activity must be judged by a limited nonstatutory exemp-
tion standard.
The Court had recognized in Allen Bradley that a union loses its
antitrust protection when it combines with a nonlabor group to aid
a business conspiracy."' After Allen Bradley, the question of whether
a requisite combination with nonlabor existed when the employer
succumbed to union demands under pressure persisted. Similarly,
the questions of whether a union's combination with a single em-
ployer would be sufficient to forfeit the exemption, and whether a
collective bargaining agreement could constitute a combination
78. See Memorandum for National Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae at 9n.10,
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local No.100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
79. See 421 U.S. at 621-22. The Court states that specific union activities, such as second-
ary picketing and boycotts, are protected by the statutory exemption. However, the statutory
exemption does not protect concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor
parties.
80. 421 U.S. at635n.16 (emphasis added). See discussion of these proposals at text accom-
paning notes 99 through 119 infra.
81. 325 U.S. 797 (1945). In the majority's view of the facts, the union lost its antitrust
immunity because it had aided and abetted a business conspiracy. Justices Murphy and
Roberts argued in dissent that the majority had mischaracterized the facts and that the
agreements were instigated by the union. It appeared, however, that Allen Bradley was not
interpreted to prohibit parallel collective agreements effecting market control when the agree-
ments were union-sponsored. See Preliminary Analysis, supra note 74, at 270-71.
[Vol. 7
19761 Labor's Antitrust Exemption
with nonlabor, remained unanswered."2 These questions were par-
tially answered in Jewel Tea, where the Court stated that the fact
that the parties to a challenged agreement were but a single em-
ployer and the union representing the company's employees did not
compel immunity for the agreement.13 Following the decision, com-
mentators recognized that the union had, in effect, been acting
alone when it forced the employer to sign the disputed marketing-
hours provision. Further, according an employer the right to bring
suit under the Sherman Act to vindicate his compelled participation
in bargaining arms employers with extremely powerful weapons
with which to discourage union demands at the bargaining table. 4
It was unnecessary for the Jewel Tea Court to explore the ramifica-
tions of imposing antitrust liability on unilateral union activity
since it found the challenged provision protected as "intimately
related" to wages, hours and marketing conditions.
The Connell decision thus clarifies the Court's view that a union's
success in compelling an employer's agreement to a contract may
be sufficient to subject it to antitrust liability.15 The dangers inher-
ent in such a posture are obvious. The only means by which a union
can ever secure implementation of its objectives is through agree-
ment with an employer," but it now seems that the mere signing of
82. See Labor's Antitrust Exemption, supra note 24, at 747-48.
83. 381 U.S. at 689.
84. See, e.g., Labor's Antitrust Exemption, supra note 24, at 757. The author suggests
that the Court's assumption - that a collective bargaining agreement signed by a single
employer could create the requisite combination with nonlabor even though the employer
initially resisted inclusion of the disputed provision - constituted a "radical departure" from
lower court precedent. The author terms "even more startling" the Court's conclusion that
the sole nonlabor party to the agreement could challenge it under the antitrust laws.
85. Only Justice Douglas seemed to recognize that the Connell agreement should not
properly be characterized a combination with nonlabor. Citing Allen Bradley, he pointed out
that Congress had not intended to immunize union participation in business conspiracies
from the Sherman Act. The Connell situation, he asserted, did not fall within the Allen
Bradley rule since the company had alleged no conspiracy. Therefore, the agreement should
have been regulated solely by the labor laws. 421 U.S. at 638. For a discussion of a similar
situation from the point of view of an injured subcontractor see Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d
306 (4th Cir. 1973). The subcontractor brought an antitrust suit after a union and two general
contractors agreed to terminate his contract. The subcontractor made no claim under the
labor laws. The court found that the general contractors had terminated their contracts with
the subcontractor as a result of union pressure, and held that this activity did not constitute
a combination with nonlabor; since the union had acted alone, it could not be liable under
the antitrust laws.
86. See the discussion in Justice Goldberg's Jewel Tea-Pennington opinion, 381 U.S. at
721.
Professor Archibald Cox has recognized the incongruity of such a result. It appears after
Connell that unions may strike, picket and boycott with immunity, but will become liable
under the antitrust laws when the employer concedes to the demands and signs a contract.
See Pennington and Jewel Tea, supra note 6, at 327 (1966).
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a collective bargaining agreement might subject a union to liability
under the Court's limited nonstatutory exemption for union-
employer agreements. Such a characterization will greatly restrict
the scope of the statutory exemption as very few union activities
will now be deemed unilateral.
In Connell, the Court clearly states that while the statutory ex-
emption would "exempt specific union activities, including second-
ary picketing and boycotts" from operation of the antitrust laws, the
statutory exemption would not protect "concerted action or agree-
ments between unions and nonlabor parties."87 However, citing
Jewel Tea, the Court conceded that some union-employer agree-
ments are to be allowed a "limited nonstatutory" exemption." The
Court pointed out that although the statutory exemption allows a
union to accomplish some restraints by acting unilaterally, as in the
Carroll situation, the nonstatutory exemption "offers no similar pro-
tection when a union and a nonlabor party agree to restrain compe-
tition in a business market." 9 After a discussion concerning the
effects of the Connell agreement upon the market, the Court con-
cluded that the union could not claim a nonstatutory exemption."
Apparently, although the Court does not so state, the standards
enunciated in Jewel Tea should govern the union's claim to a non-
statutory exemption."' Thus, the union should be protected if its
In Allen Bradley, the Court discussed this point and concluded:
Since union members can without violating the Sherman Act strike to enforce a
union boycott of goods, it is said they may settle the strike by getting their employ-
ers to agree to refuse to buy the goods. Employers and the union did here make
bargaining agreements in which the employers agreed not to buy goods manufac-
tured by companies which did not employ the members of Local No. 3. We may
assume that such an agreement standing alone would not have violated the Sher-
man Act.
325 U.S. at 809.
87. 421 U.S. at 622.
88. Id. The designation of the exemption allowed some union-employer agreements as
"nonstatutory" is apparently a new innovation of the Connell Court. In its previous decisions,
the Court did not distinguish between the two types of exemptions, and appeared to analyze
the fact situations in view of what is now termed the statutory exemption. In Jewel Tea, it
seemed that the "intimately related" test was a new interpretation of the statutory exemp-
tion. See 381 U.S. at 688-97.
89. 421 U.S. at 622-23. It thus appears that the Court has formulated two different classes
of antitrust exemptions for labor. The statutory exemption for unilateral activity is broad and
may probably be defined in terms of the Hutcheson decision. The nonstatutory exemption is
more limited, but the Court fails to clearly articulate what activities it protects. However,
by classifying the Connell agreement as a combination with nonlabor so as to entitle it to
only a limited nonstatutory exemption, the Court effectively limits the Hutcheson holding
by limiting the definition of unilateral union activity.
90. Id. at 625.
91. Id. at 622.
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activities are "intimately related" to wages, hours and working
conditions, mandatory subjects of bargaining. Jewel Tea suggests
that this determination is to be made by balancing the benefit to
labor of an agreement against its impact on the product market.
However, Carroll implies that only the labor interest is to be consid-
ered in determining the existence of an "intimate relation."92 Of
course, the preliminary obstacle to the application of this standard
to the Connell facts is that in the absence of a bargaining relation-
ship there are no mandatory subjects of bargaining.9"
Subsequent to Jewel Tea, it was suggested that the focus on man-
datory subjects of bargaining would automatically exclude any
union secondary activity from the labor exemption.9" Because such
an approach would signal a virtually inevitable return to the dis-
credited Duplex rationale, lower courts have chosen not to follow
this'restrictive interpretation. Rather, the inquiry has been directed
toward whether the agreements served to achieve better wages,
hours and working conditions generally for union members, and has
not involved whether the specific agreement concerned a mandatory
subject of bargaining in the particular instance.95
Without noting the absence of a mandatory subject of bargaining,
the Court seemingly analyzes the Connell agreement in view of the
Jewel Tea criteria, although the operation of those criteria in the
progression of the Court's analysis is difficult to detect. Although
the Court did admit that organizing was a "legitimate" union goal,
the Court failed to consider the necessity of the subcontracting
92. See text accompanying notes 37 through 44 supra.
93. Within a collective bargaining relationship, a subcontracting clause has been held to
be a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rockford Building
and Constr. Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1965) and cases cited therein.
94. See Comment, 55 CAL. L. REV. 254, 266-68 (1967), where the author suggests that prior
to Jewel Tea the Court defined the scope of labor's antitrust exemption in terms of conduct
made non-enjoinable by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, i.e. all peaceful union conduct under-
taken in the course of a labor dispute. It is further suggested that the Court in Jewel Tea
abandoned this approach and switched its emphasis to the concept of the bargaining unit
and the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act
and that the Court narrowed the limits of the exemption to activities protected under the
NLRA.
This analysis indicated that the Court may have been shifting toward the approach taken
in Connell-that to be immune from the antitrust laws, the union conduct must be aimed at
protecting the wages, hours and working conditions of union members within the bargaining
unit. Such a position signals a return to the pre-Hutcheson posture that union secondary
conduct is not antitrust exempt.
95. The Connell appeals court took this approach and found that the subcontracting
agreement was necessary because of the difficulty involved in organization in the construction
industry, which is of an ambulatory nature and often involves a lack of continuity between
the various parties on a construction site. 483 F.2d at 1167-68. See also Cedar Crest Hats v.
United Hatters, 362 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1966).
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agreement to the union's organizing campaign, and the benefit of
the agreement to union members generally.
Apparently, the Court has, in some manner, utilized the balanc-
ing element of Justice White's Jewel Tea analysis, deeming the
restraint on the product market to outweight the benefit to the labor
market without even considering the possible benefit to union mem-
bers. The Court enunciates the rule that restraints on the business
market which do not follow naturally from the elimination of com-
petition over wages and working conditions will not be antitrust
exempt."
It is difficult to understand, in the absence of explanation of the
underlying rationale of the opinion, why the Court deems the
Connell agreement so heinous. The anticompetitive effect of the
questioned agreement is substantially similar to that of a contract
authorized under section 8(e), and is, in fact, the goal of any legal
hot-cargo agreement in the construction industry. 7 Although the
Court implies that the national policy of fostering collective bar-
gaining might salvage such an agreement within the collective bar-
gaining context, Jewel Tea demonstrates that the collective bar-
gaining relationship is not an absolute shield from antitrust liabil-
ity.
There are inherent difficulties with the Court's approach to the
nonstatutory exemption. First, it suffers from the same vagueness
as the standards previously enunciated in the Apex-Allen Bradley-
Jewel Tea line of cases. Additionally, this exemption is exceedingly
difficult to apply. A determination regarding which restraints follow
naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and work-
ing conditions by a lower court would require that the court apply
its own notions of the proper balance of industrial power. The very
purpose of the broad exemption of Norris-LaGuardia was to elimi-
96. 421 U.S. at 625.
97. See Appendix to Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 31a, 32a, Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local No.100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). NLRB General Counsel Peter
Nash states:
[O]rganizing in the building and construction industry both prior to and subse-
quent to the 1959 amendments, was and is primarily carried on by building and
construction trades councils on behalf of their constitutent craft locals. The build-
ing trades agreements proffered are not conventional collective-bargaining agree-
ments, nor is a conventional collective-bargaining relationship sought, but rather
an attempt is made to obtain skeleton agreements (containing little more than
subcontracting provisions) which in turn are augmented by the execution of
collective-bargaining agreements by the individual trade unions, the latter agree-
ments containing provisions governing wages and other substantive conditions of
employment.
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nate this type of judicial balancing."
Moreover, examination of congressional activity surrounding en-
actment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,11 the Landrum-Griffin Act
in 1959, o00 and subsequent proposals clearly evidences congressional
intent to preserve the existing statutory scheme.
CONGRESSIONAL REJECTION OF ATTEMPTS TO NARROW LABOR'S
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
During consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act, the House Bill, as
initially reported and passed, proposed to exclude "unlawful sec-
ondary activities" from the Norris-LaGuardia Act'0 ' and would have
subjected such activities to liability under the Sherman Act.'0 2 The
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare also decided to
prohibit secondary boycotts, but afforded injunctive relief upon
application to the NLRB to injured parties. No provision for private
suits was made.' 3
Four members of the Senate Committee expressed their intent to
offer floor amendments to strengthen several provisions of the bill.' 4
Senator Ball, in the course of floor debate, offered an amendment
designed to correct the interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia and
Clayton Acts made by the Supreme Court in the Hutchinson [sic]
case, and a number of other cases brought by former Assistant
Attorney General Thurman Arnold, when he attempted to break
up monopolistic practices on the part of labor unions, sometimes
acting on their own, sometimes in conspiracy with employers.' °1
Senator Taft opposed the Ball Amendment on the ground that the
"temper of the Senate" was opposed to restoring injunctive relief for
secondary boycotts and offered a "substitute, which provides for
direct suits in cases of secondary boycotts."'0 6 The Ball amendment
98. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 483-88 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also Di Cola, supra note 6, at 721-22; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 230-36 (1941).
99. 61 Stat. 136, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970).
100. 73 Stat. 519, codified at scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1970).
101. H.R. 3020, 89th Cong., Ist Sess.; I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 206-07 [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. 1947].
102. H.R. 3020, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., § 12(a)(3) (1947); I LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 101,
at 205.
103. S. 1126, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); I LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 101, at 413-14,
428.
104. S.REP. No. 105, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947); I LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 101, at
456.
105. 93 CONG. REC. 4838 (1947); II LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 101, at 1354.
106. 93 CONG. REc. 4843-44 (1947); II. LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 101, at 1365.
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was defeated 62-28, and Senator Taft's amendment ultimately be-
came section 303 of the Act.'"7
The compensatory nature of the section 303 damage remedy was
made clear by Senator Taft's statement that the measure was de-
signed only to "restore to people who lose something because of
boycotts . . . the money which they have lost.""'" That this remedy
was intended to preclude possible antitrust liability was decisively
stated:
Under the Sherman Act the same question of boycott damage is
subject to a suit for damages and attorneys' fees. In this case we
simply provide for the amount of actual damages. "'"
It is thus clear that in 1947 Congress specifically defeated propos-
als to repeal the interpretation of Norris-LaGuardia expressed in
Hutcheson and precluded Sherman Act liability for anticompetitive
unfair labor practices by providing an exclusive alternative remedy.
Similar action occurred in 1959, when Congress sought to provide
for "loopholes" in the secondary activity regulation. "'" Section
107. 93 CONG. REC. 4858 (1947); II LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 101, at 1370-71. See 29
U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
108. 93 CONG. REC. 4858 (1947); II LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 101, at 1398.
109. 93 CONG. REC. 4872-73 (1947); II LEG. HIST. .1947, supra note 101, at 1370-71.
110. When Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it probably intended, in sec-
tion 8(b)(4), to outlaw all secondary boycotts. Section 8(b)(4)(A) made it illegal for a union
to induce or encourage employees to strike or engage in a concerted refusal to work, where
the object was to force an employer to stop doing business with another employer. See
Fleming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw.U. L. REV. 666, 681 (1960). Hot-
cargo contracts, which require that union workers not be allowed to handle nonunion work,
generally tended to fall within this section. See also Brinker, Hot Cargo Cases in the Con-
struction Industry Since 1958, 22 LAB. L.J. 690 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brinker].
Several years of experience under Taft-Hartley revealed that Congress had left loopholes
in its provisions for regulating secondary boycotts. Judicial and Board interpretations re-
quired that, to find a violation, the union's objective had to be to force one employer to stop
doing business with another and that the means to this end had to be a strike or the induce-
ment of employees to strike. See Address by NLRB General Counsel Stuart Rothman, Insti-
tute on the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Feb. 12, 1960, Emory
University School of Law, in 45 L.R.R.M. 78 (1960). The major decision in this area was Local
No. 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958), which
held that a hot-cargo agreement would be legal so long as it was entered into voluntarily by
the employer, but a strike to enforce such a clause would be illegal.
Therefore, when Congress considered reform legislation in 1959, it specifically created
section 8(e) to outlaw all hot-cargo agreements. See generally, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.
19591. The provision makes it an unfair labor practice for a union and an employer to enter
into a hot-cargo agreement, express or implied, including those voluntarily agreed upon by
the employer. Further, the Landrum-Griffin Act amended section 8(b)(4) so that section
8(b)(4)(ii) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to threaten or coerce an employer to
enter into an agreement illegal under section 8(e). See generally Cox, The Landrum-Griffin
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959); Farmer, The
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8(b)(4),"' which designates use of coercion to obtain an illegal hot-
cargo contract an unfair labor practice, and section 8(01,,2 which
bans most hot-cargo agreements, were enacted as amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act. During consideration of the
amendments, Congressman Alger availed himself of the opportunity
to reiterate dissatisfaction with Hutcheson and Allen Bradley:
Court decisions which removed labor organizations from antitrust
laws were handed down in 1941 by the Supreme Court by United
States against Hutcheson when the Court, in effect, said:
If you are a labor union and you determine in your mind that
what you desire to do-although unlawful to everybody
else-is in the self-interest of your union, it becomes legal. No
matter how much damage this activity may inflict upon the
economy, society, or individuals, it is legal-because you say
it is in the union's self-interest.
Then, in a 1945 decision, the Court opened the door still wider to
union freedom from legal restraint. In simple terms, it said:
Labor unions have a license to impose whatever economic
restraints they wish without regard to their effect upon the
rest of society." 3
The House rejected an amendment co-sponsored by Representa-
tives Alger and Hiestand, which provided that nothing contained in
the National Labor Relations Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act
Status and Application of the Secondary-Boycott and Hot-Cargo Provisions, 48 GEO. L.J. 327
(1959). However, a proviso to section 8(e) specifically excludes from its prohibitions such
agreements in the construction industry, so long as the agreements relate to contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the construction site. Although it seems clear that the
proviso means that a general contractor and a union may lawfully agree that all subcontrac-
tors on a job must employ union labor, most of the litigation concerning the reach of this
exception has concerned the definition of work performed on the jobsite. See, e.g., Acco
Constr. Equipment, Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Brinker, supra
this note.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) provides:
(4) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(A) forcing or requiring any employer ... to enter into an agreement which is
prohibited by subsection (e) of this section.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unen-
forceable and void ....
113. 105 CONG. REC. 1554-55 (1959); II LEG. HIST. 1959, supra note 110, at 1570.
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shall be deemed to exempt from the application of the antitrust
laws of the United States . . . any employer, labor organization,
or other person who becomes a party to or engages or participates
in any such contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce. 14
Representative Alger specifically stated that his proposed amend-
ment would have made it unlawful under the antitrust laws for a
union to "[e]nter into any arrangement-voluntary or
coerced-with any employer, groups of employers, or other unions
which cause product boycotts, price fixing, or other types of restric-
tive trade practices." 5
During discussion of the Landrum-Griffin Bill, Representative
Griffin pointed out that his bill was a "substitute" for Representa-
tive Alger's proposal, and contained "no antitrust law provision.""'
This bill was enacted as the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
Two years subsequent to the enactment of Landrum-Griffin, Sen-
ator McClellan, with five other Senators, introduced a bill to pro-
vide antitrust liability for illegal hot-cargo contracts in the transpor-
tation industry."7 Such agreements were already expressly prohib-
ited by section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. While the
bill never reached a vote, as was pointed out by the majority,"" it
does serve to demonstrate that at least six members of the Senate
recognized that Connell-type agreements were violations of section
8(e) but were not, under the existing law, subject to antitrust chal-
lenge.
It would thus appear that Congress repeatedly reflected its ap-
proval of the statutory exemption as interpreted in Hutcheson and
rejected attempts to narrow its scope." 9 Moreover, when Congress
did decide to outlaw certain anticompetitive union activities, it did
so, not by subjecting them to the antitrust laws, but by providing
specific alternative remedies under the labor laws.
114. 105 CONG. REC. 15853 (1959); I LEG. HIST. 1959, supra note 110, at 1685.
115. 105 CONG. REC. 15533 (1959); I LEG. HIST. 1959, supra note 110, at 1569.
116. 105 CONG. REc. 15535 (1959); II LEG. HIST. 1959, supra note 110, at 1571-72.
117. S. 2573, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
118. 421 U.S. at 635.
119. See Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., 494 F.2d 541,
554-56 (9th Cir. 1974). Circuit Judge Sneed reviewed the legislative history of the 1947 and
1959 labor acts and concluded that "nothing in the legislative history of either of these Acts
indicates either a congressional intent to narrow the scope of that antitrust immunity pre-
viously accorded to all unions under the Clayton, Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor
Relations Act .... " Id. For a general discussion of the labor-antitrust problem from a
legislative viewpoint, see Dooley, Antitrust Legislation and Labor Unions, 11 LAB. L.J. 911
(1960).
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The Connell dissenters reviewed this legislative history and found
that since the conduct in question was arguably an unfair labor
practice, it was not to be regulated under the antitrust laws.,2"
Lower courts have also had difficulty when presented with antitrust
complaints for activities which could also constitute unfair labor
practices. Generally, it has been recognized that conduct specifi-
cally made legal by the National Labor Relations Act cannot be the
basis of a federal antitrust suit, 2 ' although it has also been held that
the two considerations are separate and independent. 22
When conduct is found illegal under the labor laws, it has proved
even more difficult for courts to accommodate the possibility of an
antitrust claim. Two circuit courts have manifested the viewpoint
that all labor issues should be certified to the NLRB before any
antitrust determination can be made.'23 Some courts have voiced
the opinion of the Connell dissenters: violations of the labor laws
should not give rise to antitrust liability, 2 ' although it has also been
held that the labor laws provide no shield from liability for conduct
which violates them. 25
The Connell majority made short shrift of this primary contention
of the dissenters. 2 The rationale for the majority's rejection of the
120. 421 U.S. at 638-55.
121. The leading case standing for this proposition is Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rock-
ford Building and Construction Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1965). On facts similar
to those of Connell, the court held that the agreement in question was authorized by section
8(e). Therefore, "it would be unreasonable to hold that success in securing such an agreement
constitutes a violation of the anti-trust laws." 354 F.2d at 3. In Papazian v. Los Angeles
Trades Council, 83 L.R.R.M. 2710 (C.D. Calif. 1973), the court held that section 8(e) pro-
tected the union's efforts to compel a general contractor to execute a collective bargaining
agreement containing a clause preventing the general from subcontracting work to nonunion
subcontractors. Therefore, the plaintiff's antitrust claim was without merit. See also Califor-
nia Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated General Contractors, 70 L.R.R.M. 2412 (E.D.
Calif. 1969), which holds that contracts made in accordance with § 8(e) cannot violate the
antitrust laws. The Connell district court followed the rationale of these decisions.
122. See Morse Bros. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 87 L.R.R.M. 2833
(D. Or. 1974), where the court purported to follow the Fifth Circuit Connell decision, but
concluded that compliance with section 8(e) would not necessarily insulate an agreement
from the antitrust laws. See also Thomson Newspapers, Inc. v. Toledo Typographical Union,
387 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mich. 1974), where it was held that since an antitrust action, even
though involving the same facts as a labor complaint, is based on an entirely different theory
of law, the question of whether the alleged activities are proper under the National Labor
Relations Act would not dispose of the question of an antitrust violation.
123. See International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483
F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973); Carpenters Dist. Council v. United Contractors Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119
(6th Cir. 1973).
124. See, e.g., National Dairy Products Corp. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union,
Local No. 680, 308 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
125. See notes 122 and 123 supra and cases cited therein.
126. 421 U.S. at 634-35 n.16.
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argument that section 303 should provide the exclusive remedy for
labor law violations was that Congress never specifically amended
section 303 to include section 8(e) violations.'27 This approach, how-
ever, avoids the issue because section 8(e) was incorporated by refer-
ence into section 8(b)(4), which makes it an unfair labor practice
to employ coercion to obtain an illegal hot-cargo contract. Section
303 was amended to apply to this very type of unfair labor practice,
and, as the dissent points out, the full range of NLRB remedies is
available for violations of section 8(e). 2 8
The majority's viewpoint seems even less defensible when it is
considered that the conduct in question may not have been a viola-
tion of the labor laws. The relationship of section 8(b)(4) to section
8(e) demonstrates that it is legal to strike to obtain a hot-cargo
clause which is permitted under section 8(e), while it is a violation
of 8(b)(4) to strike to obtain a clause not permitted under section
8(e).' 29 Thus, if the agreement forced upon Connell fell within the
protection of section 8(e), the company would have no remedy.' 30
Apparently, the precise question presented by Connell-whether
section 8(e) sanctions subcontracting clauses in the construction
industry in the absence of a collective bargaining relationship-had
not been decided by either the NLRB or any court.' 3 ' However, it is
127. The very nature of section 303 goes against the Court's conclusion that it cannot
remedy the Connell situation. It has been construed broadly to allow a third party to sue for
damages caused by a secondary boycott if the injured party is in the direct line of fire between
the union and the primary object of the secondary boycott. See, e.g., W.J. Milner & Co. v.
Local No. 349, IBEW, 476 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1973).
128. 421 U.S. at 652.
129. Initially, since the construction industry was not specifically excepted from section
8(b)(4), it was thought that strikes to obtain hot-cargo contracts authorized by section 8(e)
would continue to be illegal. See Colson & Stevens Constr. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1650 (1962).
This position was rejected by some courts: Constr. Laborers Union Local No. 383 v. NLRB,
323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963); Essex County & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3rd Cir. 1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d
534 (D.C.Cir. 1964). This position was finally adopted by the NLRB in Centlivre Village
Apartments, 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964). The NLRB has made it clear that a union may strike
to obtain a hot-cargo agreement allowable under section 8(e). See Memorandum for National
Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae at 8, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfit-
ters, Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
130. The Connell dissenters recognized this possibility. 421 U.S. at 648.
131. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local No. 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1174
(5th Cir. 1973); Memorandum for National Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae at 9,
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
Moreover, the NLRB has refused to issue a complaint in a similar case against the same union
involved in Connell. See Appendix to Respondent's Brief on the Merits, Connell Constr. Co.
v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). It strongly suggests that if
the NLRB were to consider this question, it would find the agreement protected by section
8(e).
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established, as the Court recognizes, that Connell-type agreements
are protected in the context of collective bargaining.' 2
The Court's conclusion is based upon the fact that some lower
courts have found that Congress intended to minimize jobsite fric-
tion between union members and nonunion workers in its enact-
ment of section 8(e).' 3 Congressional purpose, however, does not
appear to be so limited, 3' especially in view of the close community
of interests at a construction site."' Additionally, the Court appears
to focus on the anticompetitive aspect of the agreement in denying
the union's exemption claim. Since the anticompetitive effect of the
agreement would be the same if the union represented some of the
company's employees, it is curious that the Court so cursorily dis-
misses the claim to labor law protection. The majority's position
renders the labor law prohibition against hot-cargo contracts super-
fluous, 3 as it will always be more advantageous for an injured party
to sue under the antitrust treble damage provisions. Such a result
contravenes the existing congressional mandate that only actual,
compensatory damages are recoverable for labor law violations.'
Further, by characterizing the Connell agreement as beyond the
scope of the labor laws, the Court avoided disposition of the ques-
tion of whether unfair labor practices are to be regulated solely
under the labor laws. It is entirely possible that lower courts will
read the Connell opinion as authorization for use of the antitrust
laws to regulate certain union secondary activity.
However, early indications are that the restrictive implications of
the Connell decision, like its predecessors Pennington and Jewel
Tea, may be somewhat ignored by the lower federal courts."' In-
deed, Congress has already circuitously attempted to foster pre-
cisely such treatment of the Connell holding. While considering a
132. 421 U.S. at 621.
133. Acco Constr. Equipment, Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1975); Drivers,
Salesmen, Etc., Local No. 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Essex County &
Vicinity District Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 640 (3rd Cir. 1964).
134. See Appendix to Respondent's Brief on the Merits, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
and Steamfitters, Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
135. Id.
136. See Note, 89 HARV. L. REv. 234, 239-40 (1975).
137. See, e.g., Teamsters Local No. 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964).
138. Post-Connell labor/antitrust decisions have not accorded these implications a great
deal of attention. In Carpenters v. General Contractors, 90 L.R.R.M. 2511 (N.D. Calif. 1975),
the court stated that disputes between unions and employers do not normally give rise to
violations of the antitrust laws. Only an agreement between a union and an employer to
conspire in some respect gives rise to an antitrust violation; the normal labor dispute does
not. In Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Peca, 405 F. Supp. 99 (D. Hawaii 1975), the court dis-
cussed the labor exemption in terms of Allen Bradley without citing Connell.
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bill to broaden the on-site picketing powers of unions in the con-
struction industry, a bill which at best related only tangentially to
the major issues in Connell, Congress apparently made a deliberate
effort to undercut the validity of the decision.'39
Both the House and Senate committee reports on the Construc-
tion Site Picketing Bill noted the Connell decision, and included
language calculated to discredit the holding on all issues. The Sen-
ate report devoted considerable space to the labor exemption from
the antitrust laws."' Secondary boycotts, it stated, were first regu-
lated under federal law by the antitrust laws, a situation exempli-
fied by the Duplex decision.
The report interpreted Duplex as limiting the labor exemption to
the employer-employee relationship, so that economic activity by
a union against an employer whose employees it did not represent,
or whose wages and working conditions were not the subject of the
dispute, would be a Sherman Act violation-an analogue to the
Connell holding.
Duplex, the report continues, provided the impetus for the enact-
ment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which effectively overruled that
decision. Additionally, when Congress in 1947 sought to regulate the
secondary boycott, it did so not by "reintroducing the antitrust
law,".but by providing section 8(b)(4) and section 303 as remedies,
to "protect a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disa-
greement between an employer and his employees.""' Further, the
report states Senator Taft's view that the 1947 bill, in regulating
secondary boycotts under the National Labor Relations Act, "did
not entail a return to the regulation of labor's economic weapons
139. See Construction Site Picketing Bill, H.R.5900 and S.1479, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). These bills were the latest in a series of congressional attempts to overrule NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. Trades Counc., 341 U.S. 675 (1951), and allow common situs picketing in the
construction industry. For a discussion of previous legislative attempts in this area, see Note,
Common Situs Picketing and the Construction Industry, 54 GEO. L.J. 962 (1966); S. REP. No.
438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1975). See also Janofsky & Peterson, The Exercise of Unrev-
iewed Administrative Discretion To Reverse the United States Supreme Court, 25 LAB. L.J.
729 (1974). Hearings on the House version of this bill commenced at approximately the time
Connell was decided. It was stated at that time that the bill, as passed by the House and
sent to the Senate, seemed to deal with those activities at the site of the construction directed
at employers at the worksite, involving disputes relating to wages, hours and working condi-
tions. Since these activities are not otherwise unlawful under the National Labor Relations
Act, it would have little applicability to a Connell-type situation. See Kilberg, Interpretation
of Supreme Court's Decision in Connell Construction Company and Its Impact on Situs
Picketing Bill, 127 B.N.A. DAILY LAB. REP. (July 1, 1975).
140. See H. REP. No. 371, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975); S. REP. No. 438, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 17-20 (1975).
141. S. REP. No. 438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
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under the Sherman Act."'' 42
It is submitted that a discussion of this type is a relatively ineffec-
tive way for Congress to demonstrate its view of the proper scope of
the labor exemption. In any event, since the Construction Site Pick-
eting Bill was vetoed by President Gerald R. Ford,'43 it is doubtful
that the foregoing legislative history retains value beyond demon-
strating that, once again, Congress and the Court are at odds con-
cerning the scope of antitrust application to labor activities.
A request for legislative guidance in this area is neither new nor
unique. It may well be, as has been suggested, that developments
in economic and social conditions since the passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act justify a change in the scope of labor's exemption."'
However, as has been often stated, it is "not for judges""' to deter-
mine the national labor policy. Having indicated its unhappiness
with the result reached by the Court, Congress must attempt to
specifically deal with the scope of the labor exemption and articu-
late clear guidelines. Until it does so, the courts have no alternative
but to apply their own views of the balance to be struck in this area.
JACALYN J. ZIMMERMAN
142. Id. at 16.
143. 12 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 16-17 (1976).
144. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 6.
145. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 456 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
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